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The Custody Question and Child
Neglect Rehearings
Every child neglect case forces the judicial system to balance its con-
cern for the welfare of the child against the rights of the parent. Not
surprisingly, the tension between the child's well-being and the parent's
rights leads to inconsistencies in the law and in its application. How-
ever, needless confusion has arisen from the current practice of treat-
ing all custody questions, including both divorce and neglect, alike,
rather than constructing a rule responsive to the demands of the child
neglect cases. The problems are acute when parents petition for return
of children previously found neglected. After discussing the statutory
"neglect" threshold and the "best interests" and "unfitness" standards,
applied in general to custody disputes, this comment will suggest an
approach to parental petitions for the return of neglected children.
I. THE NEGLECT THRESHOLD
The "neglect"' threshold is the central feature of the American
statutory scheme: it is the finding of "neglect" which authorizes the
court2 to take temporary custody of the child from the parent.2 Though
there are few clear rules to guide the court in determining if a child is
1 The terms "dependency" and "neglect" are sometimes used interchangeably in discus-
sion of the statutes by commentators. In many states, however, a "dependent" child is
one whose parents fail properly to care for him solely because of poverty, whereas a
"neglected" child is one whose parents, though financially able to provide adequate care,
do not. E.g., CONN. GEM. STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (1958). In other jurisdictions, the term "de-
pendent" alone is used to describe what this comment calls a "neglected" child; and in
some states, the neglected child is termed "dependent and neglected." See, e.g., KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-802(g) (1963). For the purposes of this discussion, a "neglected" child will
be one who, by reason of parental action, condition, or omission, is deprived of the intel-
lectual, moral, emotional, or physical environment necessary to produce a competent adult
citizen. No child whose physical environment is inadequate because of parental poverty
will be considered "neglected."
2 The neglect law is generally administered by the juvenile court (with limited con-
current jurisdiction in the "family court" in some states); procedure is in most cases
unlike either civil litigation or criminal proceedings. See Simpson, The Unfit Parent:
Conditions Under Which a Child May be Adopted Without the Consent of his Parent,
39 U. DET. L.J. 347 (1962), and UNIFoRM CHD CusrODY Acr (lst tentative draft 1966).
3 The language of the statutes in a few states does not explicitly require a finding of
"neglect" or "dependency" to authorize transfer of custody, but the statutory formulations
in those states effectively impose the neglect threshold on the neglect hearings, and such
statutory ambiguities are often remedied by decisional law.
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"neglected," certain specific conditions constituting neglect are listed
in most statutes: frequent or persistent presence of the child in a place
of "ill repute" or "evil associations," complete abandonment by the
parent, dangerous employment or occupation of the child," physical
injury or abuse of the child by the parent The statutory definitions,
however, lean heavily on more ambiguous criteria: the child is ne-
glected if the parents fail to provide either such physical and medical
care "as is required by law" or is otherwise necessary,8 or such parental
care as is "necessary for the child's health, morals, and well-being,"9
or if by reason of parental "neglect, cruelty, or depravity" the child's
home is an "unfit or improper place" for him.10 And the courts often
rely on "general grounds" rather than any precise finding when they
find children neglected.:1 The apparent common element in these
various definitions of neglect lies in the principle that the state may
justifiably intervene in the child's behalf if his parents have failed to
provide a minimum level of protection and care. 12 If the court judges
the child to be neglected, it then faces the question of custody. In all
states, a neglect finding authorizes the court to transfer temporary
custody of the child to a child welfare agency for placement in a private
home or in a public institution.' 3 But the majority rule explicitly states
that the parent retains the right to permanent custody, and may later
petition for return of the child on grounds that the offending defects
in the home environment have been cured.14 It is these later petitions
with which this comment is concerned.
4 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (1958).
5 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-203(b) (1964).
6 Aiuz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 8-2014(f) (1956).
7 IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2807 (1956).
8 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.031(a) (1966). A few states, Missouri included, exempt parents
who deny certain medical care to their children on religious grounds from the operation
of the neglect statutes.
9 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1625()(2) (Supp. 1967).
1o ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1958); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169.2 I (1965).
11 See, e.g., In re Morrison, 144 N.W.2d 97, 103-04 (Iowa 1966).
12 In re Vikse, 147 Mont. 417, 421-22, 413 P.2d 876, 878 (1966). The "minimum" accept-
able standard is not precisely defined, partly because the inherently imprecise notions of
humaneness and decency intrude. But any environment in which the child is unlikely to
acquire the intellectual and social tools necessary to productive adulthood is presumably
unacceptable.
13 The court may, alternatively, leave the child with the parents, under the supervision
of a social worker, probate officer, or child welfare agency. Some statutes, and many cases,
state a policy in favor of leaving the child with the parent whenever feasible. ALA. CODE
tit. 13, § 361 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 902, 1102 (1953); In re Mathers, 371 Mich.
516, 533-34, 124 N.V.2d 878, 885-86 (1963); In re J.L.L., 402 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Mo. 1966)
(dicta); In re Sweet, 317 P.2d 231, 235 (Okla. 1957); In re State, 17 Utah 2d 349, 411 P.2d
839 (1966).
14 A small minority of state statutes apparently permit termination of parental rights
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II. OPERATION OF THE CUSTODY MECHANISM: THE
'BEST INTERESTS" RULE
The courts in many states are directed by the neglect statutes to look
to the "best interests and welfare" of the child in choosing a temporary
custodian.' 5 In others, the statutes merely list the various choices made
available to the court by the neglect finding.' 6 Subsequent petitions by
the parents for return of custody are apparently to be decided accord-
ing to the general custody law of the jurisdiction, absent statutory
mention of the "best interests" test.'7
The "best interests" formula is applied in the majority of jurisdic-
tions whenever temporary custody is in issue; in states which follow this
standard, courts apparently do not discriminate among types of custody
disputes, but impose the "best interests" test on all situations from
divorce decrees to neglect cases.' The rule provides that the court in
assigning custody balance the parental environment directly against the
available alternatives. An alternative environment need only be judged
significantly more conducive to the child's welfare and best interests to
sustain a transfer of custody away from the parents.19
without a finding of unfitness. E.g., CoLo. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6(c) (1963); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-178 (1960).
15 This is the case in Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming,
and the District of Columbia. In addition, the "best interests" formula is read into
the statutes by judicial determination in some states. E.g., Bregar v. Seymour, 74 Il. App.
2d 197, 219 N.E.2d 265 (1966); Hendricks v. Curry, 401 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1966).
16 E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-824(b) (1965).
17 The statutes do not explicitly incorporate the general custody law into the neglect
cases; but it is apparently generally assumed by courts and commentators alike that there
is no "special" custody rule for neglect cases, once temporary custody has been taken
from the parent under the neglect statute. Idaho, however, specifies that the "best inter-
ests" test is to be applied at custody rehearings. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1638 (1967).
1 See Bregar v. Seymour, 74 IlL. App. 2d 197, 216 N.E.2d 265 (1966); Hendricks v.
Curry, 401 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1966); Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d
185 (1965). Simpson, supra note 2, disagrees as to the general custody rule when parent and
nonparent compete for custody; but see cases cited in Halstead v. Halstead, 144 N.W.2d
861, 864-65 (Iowa 1966). Sources which hold the "unfit parent" standard to be the general
rule rely largely on old cases. E.g., Kay & Philips, Poverty & the Law of Child Custody,
Tx LAw OF THE POOR 393-94 (J. tenBroek ed. 1966). The "best interests" test is now ap-
parently the dominant rule, though quite a few jurisdictions still formally follow the
"unfit parent" doctrine. See, e.g., B. ARMSTMONG, 2 CALIFORNIA FAM LY LAw 993-94 (Supp.
1966). Confusion as to the rule followed is compounded by the courts, which often state
both the "best interests" and "unfit parent" rules as governing law in the course of a
single opinion, as in In re Guardianship of C., - N.J. Super. -, 237 A.2d 652, 662, 664
(Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1967), where the court states the "unfit parent" rule as a "public
policy" of the jurisdiction, but concludes that the custody question turns on the "best
interests" issue.
19 Giacopelli v. The Crittenton Home, 16 Ill. 2d 556, 158 N.E.2d 613 (1959) (maj. opin-
Painter v. Bannister0 is a recent and well-publicized case illustrating
the effect of the "best interests" rule. In this instance, custody of the
child had been voluntarily transferred by the father to the child's
maternal grandparents upon the death of the mother in an auto acci-
dent; the grandparents refused to return the child to the father after
he remarried, and he brought an action in habeas corpus to regain
custody. Here, there was no adjudication of neglect and no showing
that the father had been or was likely to become a neglectful parent.
Furthermore, the court specifically found the father and his present
wife fit to have the child. 21 Nonetheless, concluding that the "stable,
conventional, middle-class, middle-west" 22 environment afforded by
the grandparents would better serve the child's welfare than the
"[greater] freedom of conduct . . . [and the] opportunity to develop
his individual talents"23 afforded by the parent, the court refused to
allow the father to resume custody.
The Painter case illustrates how the "best interests" formula may
operate when applied as a general custody rule to the parent's petition
for return of custody.24 If the rule may work this harshly in cases where
the parent is untainted by any history of neglect one would certainly
not expect more generous treatment of a formerly neglectful parent
when he petitions for return of custody.
In Commonwealth v. Ball,25 the parents of a child previously found
neglected petitioned for return of custody; they argued that they were
the rightful custodians of the child if the court found that the condi-
tions constituting neglect had been changed, and that there was little
likelihood of future neglect if the child were returned to them. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, affirming the lower court's
denial of the petition, held:
Even if the cause stated for the original commitment no
longer exists and the parents are now competent and fit to
have the care of the child, the court may, in the exercise of a
wise discretion and upon an impartial determination of the
facts in a particular case, decide that the welfare of the child
will not permit her removal from her present custody.26
ion); Kouris v. Lunn, 257 Iowa 1267, 1271-72, 186 N.W.2d 502, 505 (1965); Jones v. Sutton,
388 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Ky. 1965).
20 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
21 Id. at 1393, 140 N.W.2d at 154.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 The Michigan, Nebraska, California, and New York rules definitely do not follow
this formulation. See notes 35-38 infra and accompanying text; note 18 supra.
25 259 Mass. 148, 156 N.E. 21 (1927).
26 Id. at 151, 156 N.E. at 22.
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In the original custody proceedings, the court had to be convinced
that "neglect" was present and that the "best interests" of the child
were served in its removal from the parent. In the custody rehearing,
however, the parent must establish not only that he can provide a
proper environment for the child, but also that the home environment
would be "better for" the child than the current temporary one. The
original "neglect threshold" has been depressed: it is far more difficult
for the parent to regain the child than it was to resist loss of custody.
The threshold is lowered both in the test applied at rehearing and in
the shift of the burden of persuasion to the parent.
The heavy burden carried by the parent in petitioning for return
of custody is increased by certain factors peculiar to the neglect prob-
lem. Child welfare departments, for example, may be particularly op-
posed to returning the child to a parent formerly found neglectful.
These agencies often initiate the original neglect proceedings, and they
can hardly be expected to deal disinterestedly with cases in which
they once acted as moving party.27 In addition, most juvenile courts
have no independent source of expert psychological and sociological
analysis, and thus must rely on the child welfare agencies for specialized
advice.28 The agencies may have similar investigating and consulting
duties in other types of custody cases, but only in neglect proceedings
27 See In re Sweet, 317 P.2d 231, 233 (Okla. 1957); Sommers v. Sommers, 33 Wis. 2d 22,
28-29, 146 N.W.2d 428, 431 (1966), for examples of this tendency. Under certain circum-
stances, the interests of the parent may conflict directly with those of the agency involved, as
when the case worker feels his judgment challenged by the rehearing proceedings.
See In re Mathers, a71 Mich. 516, 124 N.W.2d 878 (1963), for an instance of the extent to
which parent and agency can dash. The child welfare agencies are quite often the com-
plainants in neglect cases. See Kay & Philips, supra note 18, at 409. R. MULFORD, V. WY-
LEGALA & F. MELSON, CASEWORKER & JUDGE IN NEGLECT CASEs (1956), a sort of combat
manual for the caseworker in court, is indicative of the attitude of the agency in juvenile
court.
28 For discussions of the inadequate current utilization of expert information, see Foster
& Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 423, 441 (1964); Skolnik, Psychiatric Evidence in
Child Custody Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 154 (1967); Walker, Measuring the
Child's Best Interests, 44 DENVER L.J. 132 (1967). Cook County, Illinois, is atypical in that
the juvenile court has its own psychiatric consultants. About one-third of the juvenile
judges have no probation and social work staff available to them, and eighty to ninety
per cent have no available psychological or psychiatric consultant. McCANE, PROFILE OF
THE NATION'S JUVENILE COURT JUDGES (monograph of the Center for the Behavioral Sci-
ences at George Washington University, 1965). Three-fourths of the judges devote less
than one-quarter of their time to juvenile matters-thus most of them cannot be said to
be "specialists" by experience in juvenile cases, much less in the problems of neglect cases.
It has been said that "good will, compassion and similar virtues are ... admirably preva-
lent throughout the system [of juvenile courts] . . . . But expertise, the keystone of the
whole venture, is lacking." Note, Juvenile Delinquents: the Police, State Courts, and In-
dividualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 809 (1966). This discussion deals directly with
the delinquency question, but is relevant as an examination of the qualifications of the
juvenile judge to deal with neglected children as well.
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are they likely to appear both as interested party and as agent of the
court. In marked contrast, the litigating parties in divorce custody
battles will arrive in court before any children's aid society or proba-
tion officer becomes involved in the case.
Furthermore, in neglect cases the legal resources of the parents can-
not be expected to match those of the agency's representative, who is
often experienced in the workings of the juvenile court and has access
to competent counsel.29 Environmental neglect cases typically involve
parents who have minimal financial and educational resources,30 and
who are therefore less likely to seek and get good legal representation.
In other classes of custody disputes, the child welfare agency may be
called on for expert advice, but the contestants are usually individuals
-if not the two parents, typically a parent and a near relative of the
child-more likely to be evenly matched than in the neglect cases.31
Thus in neglect cases the child welfare agency has systematic in-court
advantages often not balanced by any force committed to the interests
of the parent.
Statements of the "best interests" rule often mention a presumption
that the child's best interests are realized when the parent has custody.3 2
But this presumption is of uncertain force at best, and in any case is
rebuttable.33 In the neglect context, where the parent who petitions
29 Thus, R. MULFORD, V. WYLEGALA & F. MELSON, CASEWORKER & JUDGE IN NEGLEar CASES
(1956), in its fourth printing in 1964, is a thoroughgoing trial practice manual for the
caseworker, with techniques for compiling evidence, preparing a case, and presenting it
effectively.
30 Conclusive evidence is not available; but see Kay & Philips, supra note 18, at 410-11.
With the possible exception of physical abuse cases, most neglect cases involve parents
from low-income, culturally deprived environments; the neglect law, as one authority puts
it, is directed toward the poor, Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, &" the Poor
Man, Tm LAw or THE POOR 370 (J. tenBroek ed. 1966).
31 Of course, mismatches, either in financial resources or legal representation or both,
may occur, and doubtless sometimes do, when two individuals come into court. But the
neglect law alone has a built-in disparity in the relative strengths of the typical opponents;
divorce cuts across economic lines, and in general ex-spouses and relatives should be rea-
sonably well-matched. The neglect statutes of many jurisdictions are silent as to parental
counsel; the statutes which do mention counsel for the parents provide that the judge
may at his discretion arrange for (or permit) the presence of an independent legal advisor
either for the parent or for the child. The present trend is toward counsel for the child
in juvenile delinquency cases. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). But as yet no similar move-
ment for neglect proceedings has developed. Paulsen, supra note 30, at 379-82, states an
argument for use of counsel in juvenile court cases as a whole.
32 E.g., Kouris v. Lunn, 257 Iowa 1267, 1271, 136 N.W.2d 502, 505 (1965).
33 See Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966); Halstead v. Halstead,
144 N.W.2d 861 (Iowa 1966); McKay v. Mitzel, 137 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1965); Belisle v.
Belisle, 27 Wis. 2d 317, 134 N.W.2d 491 (1965); and Note, Fit Parent May be Deprived of
Custody, 4 HOUSTON L. Rav. 131 (1966), which argues that Painter overturns the parental
preference doctrine. In McKay, the parental preference is called a "right to primary con-
sideration," subordinate to the best interests of the child; the content of "primary con-
1968] Child Neglect
The University of Chicago Law Review
for return of custody must carry the double burden of persuasion on
the issues of neglect and best interests, the presumption cannot offer
much comfort: the court has in the original neglect hearing already
overcome whatever parental preference it recognizes, and taken the
child from the parent. The parent must now convince the court that
return of custody is justified.34
III. THE UNFIT PARENT: THE ALTERNATIVE CUSTODY RULE
The "best interests" rule is not the guiding principle in every juris-
diction when parent contends with nonparent for custody of the child.
In some states the parent must be held "unfit" to care for the child if
temporary custody is awarded to the nonparent. 35 Thus in Kropp v.
Shepsky, 16 a habeas corpus proceeding brought by the mother of an
infant child against the current custodians (who had previously at-
tempted to adopt the child), the New York Court of Appeals stated the
rule:
Except where a nonparent has obtained legal and perma-
nent custody of a child by adoption, guardianship or other-
wise, he who would take or withhold a child from mother or
father must sustain the burden of establishing that the parent
is unfit and that the child's welfare compels awarding its
custody to the nonparent. . . . [The] burden rests, not, for
instance, upon the mother to show that the child's welfare
would be advanced by being returned to her, but rather upon
the nonparents to prove that the mother is unfit to have her
child and that the latter's well-being requires its separation
from its mother.37
This "unfitness" threshold, which governs temporary custody dis-
positions in some of the states, is a statutory requirement for perma-
sideration" is not developed, but the court here declined to give the preference the force
of presumption. 137 N.W.2d at 794.
34 It is a general maxim of custody law that the party who seeks to alter a prior award
of (temporary) custody must show such significant change in the previous situation that
the child's best interests are served by a change in custody.
35 In re Mathers, 371 Mich. 516, 124 N.W.2d 878 (1963); Raymond v. Cotner, 175 Neb.
158, 120 N.W.2d 892 (1963); People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d
801 (1953); People v. Talbot Perkins Adoption Serv. 46 Misc. 2d 369, 259 N.Y.S.2d 440
(Spec. Term. 1965). According to B. ARMSTRONG, 2 -CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAw 993 et seq.
(Supp, 1966)- California still follows rigorously this "unfit parent" rule.
36 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953).
37 Id. at 469, 113 N.E.2d at 804. See also People ex rel Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539,
104 N..E.d 895 ,(1952),; Ball vi Ball, 180 Neb. 145, 141 N.W.2d.449 (1966); People ex re/.
Conti v. Molinari, 23 App. Div. 2d 893; 260 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1965)._,
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nent and final denial of custody to the parent in most jurisdictions.
The question of permanent custody arises in connection with the
severing of the legal parent-child relationship, a prerequisite to adop-
tion without consent of the natural parent.38
No rigid standards of parental fitness with regard to the temporary
custody question are provided in the cases following this rule. Parents
have been found "unfit" to have custody by reason of continuing emo-
tional instability,30 and it seems to be the rule that an immoral pattern
of conduct will establish unfitness, 40 although adultery alone may not.41
Disparity in physical environment is immaterial unless conditions in
the parental home are such as to be "harmful to the child." 42 Rehabili-
tation and prospective behavior are emphasized when the parent's past
conduct has been unsatisfactory. 43 Drunkenness and criminal convic-
tion 45 may establish unfitness for custody, depending on circumstances
in the case.
The statutes concerned with permanent custody or termination of
all parental rights offer little help in defining the "unfit" parent; there
are not even any partial listings of conditions presumptive of "unfit-
ness" comparable to those provided for "neglect."46 Cases dealing with
the question of permanent custody, though ambiguous, are somewhat
more useful. "Immorality," adultery (usually amounting to promiscu-
ity), cruelty, abandonment, and "neglect" are common grounds for
judgments of unfitness.47 Emotional instability of the parent and ex-
38 Statutory formulations vary. Seventeen states explicitly mention "termination of
parental rights," eight of which specify separate hearings on the termination issue alone.
In others, adoption statutes require a finding of "abandonment" by or "unfitness" of the
natural parent. Some states apparently demand only a finding of neglect before a guardian
for adoption may be appointed, though decisional law has imposed the "unfitness" stan-
dard in many of these latter jurisdictions.
39 Veseth v. Veseth, 147 Mont. 169, 174, 410 P.2d 930, 932 (1966); Belisle v. Belisle, 27
Wis. 2d 317, 320-21, 134 N.W.2d 491, 493-4 (1965).
40 E.g., Sommers v. Sommers, 33 Wis. 2d 22, 146 N.W.2d 428 (1966).
41 E.g., Jones v. Sutton, 388 S.W.2d 596 (Ky. 1965); M- L- v. Mf- R-, 407 S.W.2d
600, 604 (Mo. App. 1966); Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
42 People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953); People ex rel.
Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952).
43 Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 423 n.50 (1964); cf. id. at n.53.
44 Nf- L- v. M- R-, 407 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Mo. App. 1966); People ex rel. Kropp v.
Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953); People ex Tel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y.
539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952); Wendiand v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185
(1965).
45 Foster & Freed, supra note 43, 428 n.21.
46 E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-824(b) (1965).
47 See Simpson, supra note 2, at 355, for a list of cases; see generally Lincoln, Judicial
Considerations in Child Care Cases, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 709 (1965), for problems of appli-
cation of the unfitness standard.
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treme marital discord have also been held to constitute unfitness, with
consequent permanent denial of custody to the parent.4
Self-rehabilitation by the parent, present conditions, and future
probabilities, not past conduct, are emphasized in permanent custody
questions.49 In Fritts v. Krugh,50 involving a habeas corpus petition by
rather unsavory parents for custody of two of their children, then
living with prospective adoptive parents, the Michigan Supreme Court
discussed the statutory requirements for disposition of permanent
custody (terminating parental rights) as opposed to temporary custody:
Here, we find the legislative intent plainly set forth in the
use of the words "temporary" and "permanent." In accor-
dance with that legislative intent, we hold that, while evi-
dence of temporary neglect may suffice for entry of an order
taking temporary custody, the entry of an order for perma-
nent custody due to neglect must be based upon testimony of
such a nature as to establish or seriously threaten neglect of
the child for the long-run future.51
Thus there are two common elements underlying the various fact
situations in cases dealing with both temporary and permanent cus-
tody, when parents are deemed unfit: a history of severe and continu-
ous neglect and the high probability of future deprivation of the child
if returned to the parent.52 Basically, an "unfit" parent is one whom
the court concludes cannot or very probably will not meet the mini-
mum standards of responsibility imposed by the neglect threshold53
48 E.g., In re J.L.L., 402 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. App. 1966).
49 In re Vikse, 147 Mont. 417, 413 P.2d 876 (1966); In re Sweet, 317 P.2d 231 (Okla.
1957).
e5o 354 Mich. 97, 92 N.W.2d 604 (1958).
51 Id. at 114, 92 N.W.2d at 613.
52 See Lincoln, supra note 47, at 711; Note, Infants-Termination of Parental Rights,
14 U. KAN. L. Rxv. 117 (1965).
53 The same notion of unfitness is apparently employed in termination of rights (ne-
glect and adoption) cases and custody disputes, where the custody rule of parental fitness
is applied at all. An exception to this identity of treatment occurs on occasion when a
court, though unable to find the parent unfit enough to order termination of the parent-
child relationship (or to deny the parent temporary custody on "unfitness" grounds),
nonetheless awards custody to the party seeking adoption, on the grounds that custody
may be given to one who has kept the child for an extended time with permission of
the parent. See Simpson, supra note 2, at 358. As to this "voluntary relinquishment" doc-
trine, see People ex rel. Conti v. Molinari, 23 App. Div. 2d 893, 260 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1965). But
see Gordon v. Gordon, 317 Mass. 771, 59 N.E.2d 5 (1945); Bottoms v. Carlz, 310 Mass. 29, 36
N.E.2d 379 (1941); Raymond v. Cotner, 175 Neb. 158, 120 N.W.2d 892 (1963); People ex
rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953); and at least in recent years,
when custody is thus given to persons who have long cared for the child, courts have
tended to explain their decisions directly in "best interests" terms. Painter v. Bannister,
258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966); Kouris v. Lunn, 257 Iowa 1267, 136 N.W.2d 502
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The concept of parental fitness, applied to neglect cases when the
parent petitions for return of custody, neutralizes some, but by no
means all, of the special handicaps faced by the parent under the "best
interests" doctrine.5 4 For example, the influence of the child welfare
agency is circumscribed by the shift in the burden of proof and by
the higher threshold used to measure parental conduct and home en-
vironment. The agency continues to function as an important source
of information and expert advice, but its reports are tested against the
central issue, the assessment of the child's future environment in the
custody of the parent. The burden shift and the higher proof threshold
is of particular benefit to the parent not adequately represented by
counsel. The problem of the agency as an interested party is not, of
course, completely solved, but the higher threshold of parental mis-
conduct and the shift in the burden of persuasion mitigate possible
agency bias.
Because the concept of the unfit parent looks toward the future, it
is more closely adapted to the real question put in issue by the parent's
petition for return of custody. The central fact of the rehearing is that
the parent no longer has custody: the neglect concept is thus not di-
rectly applicable to the present situation and merely draws fhe court
back to contemplation of past circumstances.55 And the notion of "best
interests" provides no direction at all for the inquiry. The concept of
parental fitness requires the court to make an explicit judgment of the
child's prospective environment if returned to the parent.5 6
Though the parental fitness standard avoids some of the flaws in-
herent in the "best interests" rule, it does not provide an appropriate
(1965); McKay v. Mitzel, 137 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1965); Rosson v. DeArman, 323 S.W.2d
75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
54 See notes 27-34 and accompanying text supra.
55 See In re Sweet, 317 P.2d 231 (Okla. 1957).
56 The concept of the "unfit parent" provides a more precisely delimited standard for
examining the effects of parental conduct than does the notion of "best interests and wel-
fare" of the child. The court should be encouraged to consider every espect of the be-
havior of the parents and the potential effect of the home environment on the child,
but the "best interests" formula provides no framework for organizing this mass of data
and reducing it to a decision. See Giacopelli v. The Crittenton Home, 16 III. 2d 556, 567-
68, 158 N.E.2d 613, 614 (1959) (concurring opinion). For examples of dubious decisions, in
which "neglect" was found in large measure on the basis of the parents' unorthodox
religious views, see Hunter v. Powers, 206 Misc. 784, 135 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
N.Y.C. 1954); In re Watson, 95 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y.C. 1950); and In re
Black, 3 Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955). Paulsen, supra note 30, at 383-86, deals with
situations in which juvenile courts have abused the similarly wide discretion of the law
of juvenile delinquency. The "parental preference" or "presumption" attendant to the
"best interests" rule cannot guide the court's investigation even if it is given weight, for
the "presumption" only tells the court which way to decide if other things are equal, not
how to discover and evaluate those "other things."
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device for deciding whether the neglected child should be returned to
the parent. Use of the unfitness standard would raise the threshold for
denial of temporary custody to the level required for termination of
"all parental rights. But the issues presented in temporary custody dis-
'positions are fundamentally different from those involved in termina-
tion of the parent-child relationship.
In deciding temporary custody, the court investigates the prospective
home environment resulting from immediate return of the child to
the parent; in dealing with the question of permanent custody and
termination, the court inquires if the home environment is hopeless.
Application of the same legal standard to these different issues would
tend to confuse the temporary custody problem with that of permanent
custody. Such a trend would be unlikely to benefit the parent. Juvenile
courts genuinely committed to aiding the neglected child, if forced to
choose between returning the child to a currently inadequate environ-
ment and finding the parent unfit, might often take the latter course.
And a parent found unfit in a hearing dealing with temporary custody
would be hard put to resist a charge of unfitness in a subsequent peti-
tion for termination of parental rights.
Moreover, the unfitness concept is simply not designed to deal with
the temporary custody question. The unfitness test is well-adapted to
the straight-forward cases, in which it is either obvious that the child
would not suffer from being returned to the parent, or clear that the
parent is incapable of rehabilitation. But in the close cases, where the
parental environment is in transition, a more flexible standard is re-
quired. Thus in In re Vikse, 57 the Montana Supreme Court overruled
an order declaring a two-year old child dependent and neglected and
awarding permanent custody to the petitioning child welfare agency.58
Here, the child was temporarily in the custody of foster parents. The
mother had a history of emotional disturbance, including extensive
institutional care, and at the time of the hearing her prognosis was
-uncertain. The father had previously been financially unable to care
for the child, but at the time of hearing had secured construction work
and made initial efforts to find a suitable home and adult supervision
for the child during his absences at work. The father was also con-
sidering a consent divorce which would enable him to remarry and
establish a stable family relationship for his son. The court discussed
57 147 Mont. 417, 413 P.2d 876 (1966).
58 In Montana, permanent custody questions are dealt with in "dependency and ne-
glect" petitions, MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. § 10-510 (1957), although as this case demon-
strates, permanent custody depends essentially on a judgment of parental unfitness.
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the father's continuing efforts to establish an adequate environment,
and concluded that:
The problems and difficulties attending the Vikse family
are multiple and have not been completely removed. Other
considerations beyond the scope of this appeal . . . justify
continuing observation and supervision over the situation.
[The neglect statute] permits the court to return custody of
children to the parents when the conditions of dependency
have been removed, and the court may order such custody
upon whatever conditions or supervision is deemed necessary
under the facts of the case.59
The Montana court, forced to read a great deal into the neglect statute
to reach this result, clearly arrived at the correct solution: the father
was not prepared to resume custody immediately, but the situation
was fluid enough to prevent foreclosing future return of the child.
Thus neither of the general custody rules is suitable for adjudging
parental petitions for return of neglected children. The "best in-
terests" formulation does not direct the court's inquiry and puts a mas-
sive burden of persuasion on the parent. The "unfit parent" standard
does not cut finely enough to deal with the critical cases.
IV. AN APPROACH TO A NEGLECT CASE CUSTODY RULE
The neglect case custody question, unlike other custody disputes, is
not fundamentally an adversary proceeding. Other custody problems,
following from divorce actions or voluntary custody transfers by the
parent with subsequent refusal of the custodian to return the child,60
are litigated between two or more parties, each of whom seeks custody
of the child. But in the neglect case, the child is removed from the
parent by action of the court, and the parent petitions that court for
return of custody.61
Certain problems inherent in other custody proceedings are not rele-
59 147 Mont. at 423, 413 P.2d at 879. See Kline, The Validity of Long-Term Foster
Family Care Service, 44 CmL WELFARE 185 (1965), in which it is argued that long-term
foster care not involving total separation from the parent is in general the optimum
treatment for the child who must be taken from the family.
60 The latter situation is illustrated by the Painter case. The current trend is toward
minimizing the effects of the adversary contest. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY Aar (1st
Tent. Draft 1966). But whatever the procedure, the underlying contest between parties
cannot be prevented.
61 Of course, a contest may develop between the parent and the temporary custodian;
but placement with private persons is usually made by the child welfare agency which is
the official temporary custodian, and thus the clash is typically between the agency and
the parent, as in the Vikse and Mathers cases.
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vant in these special circumstances.0 2 The question of forum-shopping
is meaningless in the neglect case, wherein the forum is fixed by the
original neglect hearing. The relitigation of issues settled in the prior
proceedings, often the object of attempts to modify custody decrees in
divorce cases, is in one sense the entire purpose of the neglect rehear-
ing: the parent seeks to show that the conditions amounting to neglect
have been cured, so it is pointless to think in terms of safeguarding the
finality of the earlier decision. Finally, there is here no question of
harassment of one party by the other through the medium of the
custody dispute-the court has taken the child from the parent, and it
is hardly harassment of the court for the parent to petition for return
of custody.
But neglect cases, though free of some of the problems of other cus-
tody disputes, have dilemmas of their own. Placement-either tem-
porary or permanent-of the child who is taken from the parent is
the most immediate problem. Neglected children are not typically
the "blue-ribbon children which agencies wish to place for adoption."63
One lawyer involved in neglect cases maintains that it is very difficult
to place Caucasian children more than four or five years old for adop-
tion, and almost impossible to find adoptive parents for neglected
Negro children, and that even temporary placement (especially of chil-
dren over ten years of age) is "very slow." 64 Overcrowded facilities
severely limit the possibilities of adequate temporary placement in
institutional homes,6 5 and the effect on the child of institutional place-
ment, though at present very imperfectly understood, can be disas-
trous. 6 Under these circumstances, the court deals less with the "best
interests" of the neglected child than with his "least bad interests";
the possible utility of taking custody from the parent is minimized. It
may be best simply to yield to parental desire for custody, rather than
to leave the child in an undesirable and totally foreign cultural en-
vironment.
62 See Foster & Freed, supra note 28, at 622. Foster and Freed assume the presence of
an aggressive adversary contest between individuals in custody disputes.
63 Simpson, supra note 2, at 391. Simpson speculates that a sort of "quasi-adoption"
classification might produce significant new opportunities for placement, but offers no
evidence to support the conjecture. In any event, a new legal status for the child would
require a new custody rule tailored to it.
64 Interview with Mr. Patrick J. McNally, Chicago Legal Aid Bureau, Juvenile Court
Branch, Oct. 12, 1967.
65 Paulsen, supra note 30, at 386, describes the extent of the problem in New York.
6 Paulsen, id. at 387-88, details the shocking consequences of overcrowding in one
major facility. See generally Yarrow, Separation from Parents During Early Childhood,
I R)Ew oF CHin DEVELOPMNT RF.sEARcH 89 (M. & L. Hoffman ed. 1964), for a discussion
of recent thinking and research in the field.
[Vol. 35:478
Child Neglect
Moreover, the policy of the neglect statutes is not to break up the
family but rather to repair the unsatisfactory home environment and
make it possible for the child to remain with the parent.6 7 Non-neglect
custody cases involve situations in which the family unit is effectively
dissolved, by divorce or voluntary transfer of custody, before the cus-
tody question reaches the court, rather than by intervention of welfare
agencies in the affairs of the family. In the non-neglect cases, various
members of the dissolved family compete for custody of the child, and
the court must choose among them. But in neglect cases, the court
attempts to cure defects in an unsatisfactory environment, unless it
judges those defects incurable and finds the parent unfit to raise the
child; the family unit, if viable at all, is not to be destroyed.
Finally, neglect cases deal with a broad spectrum of issues. Some
rehearings present problems similar to those encountered at the orig-
inal neglect proceedings; others, especially those occurring some time
after the original hearing, focus on questions of long-term or indefinite
placement very close to the issue of permanent custody. Rules framed
to deal with the neglect rehearings must be flexible enough to cope
with this wide range of situations.
In each neglect case, both the effect on the child of immediate re-
turn to the parent, and the extent of the parent's efforts toward rehabil-
itation, should be reviewed. In general, the greater the rehabilitation
efforts the better the child is likely to fare. However, in some cases,
other factors may predominate. For example, if the child has been out
of the custody of its parents for some time, the court may be compelled
to place more weight upon the child's fate than upon the parents' good
works. 68 Or if the child is in an institution a lesser grade of rehabilita-
tion may suffice to gain return of custody.
The present situation of both parent and child should be reviewed
not simply to establish the balance of interests between parent and
child. Regardless of the mixture of interests between parent and
child, the court should consider the possibilities that the parents will
67 ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 361 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 9022 1102 (1953); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-2308 (1966); Kay & Philips, supra note 18, at 412. Of course, there are cases
when the child should be taken from the parent, and the courts should be sensitive to
the issues characterizing these cases; but the courts should be primarily oriented toward
curing defects in the home environment whenever feasible.
68 Courts are in some measure responsive to this issue, both with regard to detailed
psychological assessment and as a "common sense" principle, Halstead v. Halstead, 144
N.V.2d 861 (Iowa 1966); Kouris v. Lunn, 257 Iowa 1267, 136 N.W.2d 502 (1965); Painter v.
Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966); Pickens v. Pickens, 186 So. 2d 683 (La.
App. 1966); Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. 1963), Rosson v. DeArman, 323
S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). See generally Yarrow, supra note 66. In extreme cases,
postponement of return to the parent might have to be of indefinite duration.
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be-able, in the future, to establish a viable family setting. The issue is
not whether family A is better than family B, as in the "best interests"
approach. Rather the court should concentrate --upon the parents who
requested the rehearing. Certainly the "other family" situation is rele-
vant. A good custody family may permit the court to delay return of
custody in doubtful cases; a bad custody family or an institutional
situation may permit acceleration of the child's return. But the court
should avoid a simple weighing in the balance. Such a concentration
on the child's parents at rehearing does not demand a finding that the
family is hopeless, or unfit, in order to deny return of custody. Immedi-
ate return of custody may be forestalled if there is a significant possibil-
ity of future neglect. Finally, if the proper path is not clear, the
traditional preference for the natural parent should decide the case.
A custody rule tailored to these objectives should place the burdens
of persuasion at rehearing concerning both the child's welfare and the
parents' future conduct on the child welfare agency or other original
complainant, rather than on the parent. The original complainant
should be asked to persuade the court that the rights of the child, the
parents, and society as a whole would be best served by refusing to
return custody to the parent. This reversal of the burdens of persuasion
is highly desirable in view of the tactical disadvantages faced by the
parent. Moreover, it places the duty of establishing the fact issues on
the child welfare agency, which has direct access to information about
the child's present circumstances and to expert evaluation of the facts.
CONCLUSION
The application of a general custody rule to parental petitions for
return of neglected children fails to take into account the basic dif-
ferences between neglect cases and other custody disputes. Further-
more, a general neglect case rule cannot be reconciled with the position
of the custody rehearing between the polar questions of original tem-
porary placement and final, permanent disposition of custody. Thus,
the "best interests" and "unfit parent" standards are inadequate devices
for dealing with this intermediate problem. But the flaws in the two
current rules outline the real issues presented in neglect case custody
rehearings, and in so doing frame the elements of a more satisfactory
approach to the problem.
